CARDS
CARDS
Lynx is a ransomware-as-a-service operation that emerged in mid-2024 as a rebrand of INC Ransomware (whose source code was sold for $300,000 on the RAMP forum), claiming ~300 victims across manufacturing, business services, technology, and transportation with an 80/20 profit split for affiliates.
Last updated May 24, 2026, 8:00 PM EDT
Evidence Boundary
Bottom Line Up Front
Lynx is a ransomware-as-a-service operation that emerged in mid-2024 as a rebrand of INC Ransomware (whose source code was sold for $300,000 on the RAMP forum), claiming ~300 victims across manufacturing, business services, technology, and transportation with an 80/20 profit split for affiliates.[1]
Data theft, encryption, business interruption, extortion pressure, and notification/legal exposure depending on victim environment.[1]
Harden exposed remote access Monitor archive creation and mass file reads Protect backups Prepare extortion communications workflow[1]
Decision Summary
Lynx is a ransomware-as-a-service operation that emerged in mid-2024 as a rebrand of INC Ransomware (whose source code was sold for $300,000 on the RAMP forum), claiming ~300 victims across manufacturing, business services, technology, and transportation with an 80/20 profit split for affiliates.
The retained record scopes this as ransomware / extortion / cybercrime activity during Operational window varies by public reporting. Data theft, encryption, business interruption, extortion pressure, and notification/legal exposure depending on victim environment.[1]
Harden exposed remote access Monitor archive creation and mass file reads Protect backups Prepare extortion communications workflow[1]
Confirmed reporting is separated from attribution, victim, and prevalence claims that the retained sources do not establish. Confidence: Medium for public ransomware ecosystem tracking; individual claims and victim listings require local/source corroboration..[1]
Actor Mapping
Targeting
Tradecraft
Tools / Observables
Source Reconciliation
Campaign rows are retained as source-backed context. Actor mappings do not automatically merge actor records; SOCRadar, MITRE, Mandiant, CrowdStrike, Microsoft, and other future sources can disagree on boundaries, aliases, or campaign ownership.
Ransomware group and victim claims are often adversary-controlled. Validate actor linkage, malware, and impact with incident evidence.
IntelliOS
None Found
Citations