CARDS
CARDS
Qilin ransomware was first observed in July of 2022. Qilin Ransomware is written in Golang and supports multiple encryption modes; all of which are controlled by the operator. Qilin actors practice double extortion – demanding payment for a decryptor, as well as for the non-release of stolen data.
Last updated May 24, 2026, 8:00 PM EDT
Evidence Boundary
Bottom Line Up Front
Qilin ransomware was first observed in July of 2022. Qilin Ransomware is written in Golang and supports multiple encryption modes; all of which are controlled by the operator. Qilin actors practice double extortion – demanding payment for a decryptor, as well as for the non-release of stolen data.[1]
Data theft, encryption, business interruption, extortion pressure, and notification/legal exposure depending on victim environment.[1]
Harden exposed remote access Monitor archive creation and mass file reads Protect backups Prepare extortion communications workflow[1]
Decision Summary
Qilin ransomware was first observed in July of 2022. Qilin Ransomware is written in Golang and supports multiple encryption modes; all of which are controlled by the operator. Qilin actors practice double extortion – demanding payment for a decryptor, as well as for the non-release of stolen data.
The retained record scopes this as ransomware / extortion / cybercrime activity during Operational window varies by public reporting. Data theft, encryption, business interruption, extortion pressure, and notification/legal exposure depending on victim environment.[1]
Harden exposed remote access Monitor archive creation and mass file reads Protect backups Prepare extortion communications workflow[1]
Confirmed reporting is separated from attribution, victim, and prevalence claims that the retained sources do not establish. Confidence: Medium for public ransomware ecosystem tracking; individual claims and victim listings require local/source corroboration..[1]
Actor Mapping
Targeting
Tradecraft
Tools / Observables
Source Reconciliation
Campaign rows are retained as source-backed context. Actor mappings do not automatically merge actor records; SOCRadar, MITRE, Mandiant, CrowdStrike, Microsoft, and other future sources can disagree on boundaries, aliases, or campaign ownership.
Ransomware group and victim claims are often adversary-controlled. Validate actor linkage, malware, and impact with incident evidence.
IntelliOS
None Found
Citations